In existing delegation models, delegation security entirely depends on delegators and security administrators, for delegation constraint in these models is only a prerequisite condition. This paper proposes an Attribute-Based Delegation Model (ABDM) 
1. Because delegation is controlled by the delegator itself, a malicious user can delegate some important permissions to low level delegatees. 2. The delegation security relies heavily on the security administrator. 3. Delegation prerequisite condition cannot restrict the scope of delegatees more strictly. 4. It is difficult for a delegator to select qualified delegatees.
In this paper we first propose a new delegation model named Attribute-Based Delegation Model (ABDM). Delegation constraint in ABDM consists of both delegation prerequisite condition (CR) and delegation attribute expression (DAE). Only those delegatees whose prerequisite roles and DAE satisfy CR and DAE of delegation constraint can be assigned to a delegation role. In ABDM, DAE and CR form a strict delegation constraint in delegation. ABDM is a strict and secure delegation model both in temporary and permanent delegation.
But sometimes we need a less strict delegation model in temporary delegation, such as high level permissions temporarily delegated to low level users. Since ABDM does not support this kind of delegation, we propose a delegation model named ABDM X to solve this problem, which is an extension of ABDM.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work. In Section 3, we introduce ABDM model. Section 4 presents the ABDM X model. Section 5 is a discussion among ABDM, ABDM X and some existing delegation models. Conclusions and future works are presented in Section 6.
RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATION

Related Works
RBDM (Barka and Sandhu, 2000a; Barka and Sandhu, 2000b; Barka, 2002; Barka and Sandhu 2004) is the first delegation model based on role. In RBDM, a user can delegate his/her role to another user. A rule-based declarative language has been proposed in RDM2000 (Zhang et al, 2001) to specify and enforce policies in delegation. The delegation unit in RBDM and RDM2000 is "role". In RPRDM (Zhao et al, 2003) , a delegator can delegate part of their permissions to a delegatee by a "mask". Tamassia et al (2004) proposed a role-based cascaded delegation model in decentralized trust management systems.
PBDM (Zhang et al, 2003) is a flexible delegation model that supports multi-step delegation and revocation in role and permission level. In PBDM0, a user can delegate all or part of his/her permissions to delegatees. In PBDM1 and PBDM2, the permission flow is managed by a security administrator with delegeatable role (DBR). RDM2000 and RBDM can be seen as special cases of PBDM.
In most cases, a delegator cannot delegate all of their permissions to delegatees. Therefore, a low level user cannot be assigned to high level permissions. In some delegation models, delegation is managed by the delegator him/herself. RPRDM only addresses repeated and partial delegation, and delegation in RPRDM is also controlled by delegators. So is the delegation in PBDM0. In PBDM1 and PBDM2, delegation is managed by system administrators or organization security administrators, and a delegator cannot delegate high level permissions to low level users. RDM2000 and PBDM use can-delegate condition with prerequisite condition to restrict delegatees, but the prerequisite condition in these models consists only of prerequisite role or organization unit Sandhu and Munawer, 2002) . RBAC and other delegation models overlook the differences among users who have the same roles. They are all on the assumption that users who satisfy the prerequisite condition of a delegation permission can be assigned to the delegation permissions, but in some cases this is not true.
Role and user attribute has been proposed recently (Goh and Baldwin, 1998; Al-Kahtani and Sandhu, 2002; Al-Kahtani, 2003) . In RB-RBAC (Al-Kahtani and Al-Kahtani, 2003) , users who have attribute expression will be assigned to roles dynamically and automatically. Attribute expression in Ye et al (2004) indicates the user's qualifications and abilities required by a role.
Motivation
The prerequisite condition of existing delegation models only consists of prerequisite role, which indicates the qualifications and abilities of users. In fact, the prerequisite role cannot distinguish one user from the others in many cases. In RBAC, a role generally can be seen as a position in an organization, while a permission can be seen as a work or task. But in a real organization, there are only a few positions and users in the same position may have different qualifications and abilities. One cannot create different roles for different users with different qualifications and abilities for it will increase the total number of roles remarkably. Figure 1 shows a role hierarchy in a software company. When the Quality Engineer (QE) is on a business trip, part of their works must be delegated to someone else, such as a programmer. Suppose QE wants to delegate their permissions Inspect-Java-code, Inspect-VB-code and InspectDelphi-code to programmers. Obviously, these permissions have some requirements on users' qualifications and abilities, for a user without the required qualifications and abilities can hardly fulfill the work. For example, Inspect-Java-code requires the user has the qualifications and abilities of being a JAVA coder for at least two years. In existing delegation models, the prerequisite condition of this example is only a role programmer. For example, in RBDM, RDM2000 and PBDM, the delegation can be restricted by can-delegate (QE, programmer), can-delegate (QE, programmer, n) and can-delegate (QE, programmer, {Inspect-Java-code}, n) respectively, where the delegation prerequisite conditions are the same: programmer. In Table 1 , users with different qualifications and abilities can have the same role programmer. So, it is difficult for the QE to select qualified delegatees for they cannot distinguish one user from the others only by the role programmer. Sometimes it will cause an unsafe delegation. For example, QE may delegate the permission Inspect-VB-code to a JAVA coder or the permission Inspect-Javacode to a JAVA coder who has only one year's experience. To ensure a safe delegation, QE must select a user who has the required qualifications and abilities and delegate permissions to him/her. But in a situation of numerous users, this will burden the delegator or security administrator's work.
To solve this problem, we introduce the concept of user attribute with which to describe the difference among users and ensure a convenient and secured delegation.
ABDM MODEL
Delegations in ABDM are divided into two types: decided-delegatees and undecided-delegatees. For example, when a finance manager (FM) is out of work, part of the FM's permissions can be delegated to a person, say Tom, if Tom has the required qualifications and abilities. This is a decideddelegatee delegation. In another case, the FM may want to delegate some permissions to a user who has the required qualifications and abilities, but does not know who has the required qualifications and abilities. If the system can generate qualified delegatee candidates automatically, the FM can choose one of the candidates as a delegatee. This is an undecided-delegatee delegation. ABDM can solve these problems mentioned in Section 1 and make delegation securer and easier by decideddelegatee and undecided-delegatee delegation.
The delegation in ABDM is similar to that in PBDM. In ABDM, a delegator must first create a temporary delegation role, say tdr, and then assigns permissions to tdr. Finally, they can assign users to tdr. In delegation, the temporary delegation role has the same function as that of DTR in PBDM. With temporary delegation role, ABDM supports partial delegation. Unlike PBDM1 and PBDM2, there is no DBR in ABDM, for its function in delegation can be replaced by a temporary delegation role.
The delegation constraint in our delegation model consists of both prerequisite condition (CR) (Zhang et al, 2001 ) and delegation attribute expression (DAE). Only the persons who satisfy both CR and DAE can be assigned to a temporary delegation role. Users with different DAEs can be assigned to different delegation roles temporarily. With DAE and CR, ABDM has a stricter constraint in delegation. , where DAE is delegation attribute expression associated with permission. uae, roprt, ua and uav are attribute expression, attribute relation expression operator, attribute name, attribute value respectively. AND is the usual logic operator 'and'.
User
Qualifications and abilities Roles
For example, level=4, type='S' and totalу33 are uaes or DAEs, while totalу20 AND type='S' and totalу20 AND type='S' AND totalу33 are DAEs.
In some of the existing models (Al-Kahtani and Al-Kahtani, 2003) , only users can have attribute expression. The substantial improvement on it made by our work is that both users and permissions in ABDM have DAEs. A user's DAE indicates the user's qualifications and abilities, while a permission's DAE indicates a delegatee's qualifications and abilities required by the permission in delegation.
For convenience of understanding, we use u.DAE, p.DAE and tdr.DAE to denote the DAE of a user u, a permission p and a temporary delegation role tdr respectively.
Definition 2 uae i and uae j are said to have identical structures if and only if they have the same uas and roprts. uae i and uae j are said to be comparable if they have identical structures, otherwise they are incomparable.
For example, level=4 and level=5 are comparable, while level=4 and levelу5 are incomparable. Similar to recent studies (Al-Kahtani and Al-Kahtani, 2003) , we use the symbol '≥' to denote the dominance relations between two comparable uaes. We can use those rules shown in Table 2 to determine the dominance relation between two comparable uaes. The dominance relation must be specified by system. For example, we can say uae 1 (level>5) ≥ uae 2 (level>4) and uae 3 (total20) ≥ uae 4 (total30). The dominance relations between uae 5 (type≠'S') and uae 6 (type≠'J') must be manually specified.
Rule
We can say uae i dominates uae j if uae i ≥uae j . In this case, uae i is the dominant uae and uae j is the non-dominant one.
A temporary delegation role tdr has its own DAE, which is a combination of DAEs of its permissions. tdr.DAE can be automatically generated by the system. Permissions' DAEs will only be used to generate a temporary delegation role's DAE in delegation. So, dominance relation can only be tested between a user's DAE and a temporary delegation role's DAE.
For convenience of understanding, we use UAE to denote the uae set of a DAE. For example, the UAE of level>5 AND total20 is {level>5, total20}.
We use '≥' to denote the dominance relation between two DAEs:
Definition 3 We say DAE 1 ≥ DAE 2 , if ∀ uae j ∈UAE 2 , ∃ uae i ∈UAE 1 , s.t. uae i ≥ uae j , where UAE 1 and UAE 2 are uae sets of DAE 1 and DAE 2 respectively.
In this case, DAE 1 is the dominant DAE and DAE 2 is the non-dominant one. For example, we can say DAE 1 (level>5 AND total20) ≥ DAE 2 (level>4 AND total30) for level>5 ≥ level>4 and total20 ≥ total30. We can also say DAE 3 (level>5 AND total20) ≥ DAE 4 (level>4) according to definition 3.
We say a user is a qualified delegatee of tdr if their DAE ≥ tdr.DAE in delegation, otherwise they are an unqualified delegatee of tdr.
Here we introduce a DAE generation algorithm named DG algorithm as below: DG (DAE Generation) Algorithm: Input: p 1 …p n ∈P, where P is the permission set of tdr. Output: DAE of tdr Begin UAE=; for i=1 to n UAE=UAE∪UAE i , where UAE i is the uae set of p i .DAE for i=1 to |UAE| for j=1 to |UAE| if uae i ≠uae j and uae i ≥ uae j then delete uae j from UAE Return DAE =uae 1 AND…AND uae n , where uae 1 …uae n ∈UAE, n=|UAE| End In the DG algorithm, comparable uaes are tested for dominance relation one by one, and the non-dominant ones are discarded. In the end, only incomparable uaes remain in UAE and these uaes can form the tdr.DAE. Each uae in tdr.DAE has its own restriction on user's corresponding uae. Because uaes in tdr.DAE have the strictest restrictions on users, a delegator cannot delegate high level permissions to unqualified users. So, tdr.DAE generated by the DG algorithm can reflect the comprehensive requirements of users' DAEs required by delegation permissions and thus guarantee the security of delegation.
For example, suppose p 1 .DAE is level>5 AND total 40 and p 2 .DAE is level>4 AND total30. The output of DG (p 1 , p 2 ) is level>5 AND total 30 because level>5 ≥ level>4 and total 30 ≥ total 40.
ABDM Definition 4
The following is a list of ABDM components:
• R, RR, TDR, S, P, U, Ude, and Uee are set of roles, regular roles, temporary delegation roles, sessions, permissions, users, decided-delegatee candidates and undecided-delegatee candidates respectively.
• RH ⊆ RR × RR is a regular role hierarchy.
• TDRH u ⊆ TDR × TDR is a temporary delegation role hierarchy owned by a user u.
• R=RR ∪ TDR • RR ∩ TDR= • URA ⊆ U × RR is a user to regular role assignment relation.
• UDA ⊆ Ude × TDR is a decided-delegatee to temporary delegation role assignment relation.
• UEA ⊆ Uee × TDR is an undecided-delegatee to temporary delegation role assignment relation.
• UA=URA ∪ UDA ∪ UEA • PRA ⊆ P × RR is a permission to regular role assignment relation.
• PDA ⊆ P × TDR is a permission to temporary delegation role assignment relation.
• roles: U→2 R is a function mapping a user to a set of roles.
• roles (u) = {r| (u, r) ∈ UA} • per_r: RR→2 P is a function mapping a regular role to a set of permissions.
per_r(r) = {p|(∃ r' ≤ r) (p, r') ∈ PRA} • per_d: TDR→2 P is a function mapping a temporary delegation role to a set of permissions.
per_d(tdr)={p|(∃ tdr' ≤ tdr)((p, tdr') ∈ PDA)} • per_u:U→2 P is a function mapping a user to a set of permissions.
TDR→2 U is a function mapping a temporary delegation role to a set of users who are assigned to the role.
Ude(tdr)= {u|(∀p ∈ per_d(tdr))( p∉ per_u(u)) ⌳ (u,tdr) ∈ UDA}
• Uee: TDR→2 U is a function mapping a temporary delegation role to a set of qualified users.
• can-delegateU ⊆ R × CR × Uee × TDR is a delegation constraint on UEA. For example, can-delegateD {ST, TR, level=4 AND type='S' AND total=35, tdr} means that a delegator who has ST can assign a delegatee who must have role TR and their DAE satisfies level=4 AND type='S' AND total=35 to tdr. can-delegateU{ST, TR, Alex, tdr} means that a delegator who has role ST can assign Alex to tdr if Alex is a member of the qualified delegatees set of tdr and alex has role TR.
Here some examples are given to show how ABDM works. Let us discuss the case in Figure 3 . For convenience of understanding, we suppose delegatees do not have the same permissions as those of tdr before delegation. Figure 3 also gives an example of role hierarchy, user's DAE and its roles, and permission's DAE. Tom with a role QE is supposed to delegate his permission {Inspect-Java-code} to someone. First, he must create a temporary delegation role tdr. Second, he can assign permissions {Inspect-Java-code} to tdr. The tdr's DAE now is "Language=Java AND years у2".
In ABDM, the system can automatically generate a Uee(tdr) of qualified delegatee candidates after the second step. Tom can perform either decided-delegatee or undecided-delegatee delegation.
Tom can perform a decided-delegatee delegation according to the following steps: 1. Tom selects Annie and Lucy from user set; 2. Tom assigns Annie and Lucy to tdr. The delegation failed for neither Annie nor Lucy is a qualified delegatee of tdr. Tom can perform an undecided-delegatee delegation according to the following steps: 1. Tom selects a user, Alex, from Uee(tdr) which is generated by system. In this case, Uee(tdr)= {Alex, John, Mike}.
Tom assigns Alex to tdr. The delegation is successful if Alex has role TR, otherwise it failed.
Delegation revocation in ABDM is similar to that in PBDM. We believe that delegation revocation with DAE is an interesting topic for further study. 
ABDM X MODEL
Although a securer delegation model, ABDM still has its shortcoming:
There are two types of delegations: temporary and permanent. ABDM is a delegation model dealing with both types of delegations, and the delegation constraint of a temporary delegation role in these two delegations is identical. But in a real situation, delegation constraint of a temporary delegation role in a temporary delegation is always less strict than that in a permanent delegation. So, with permanent delegation constraint, a delegator sometimes cannot temporarily delegate their permissions to a delegatee.
In the case in Table 3 , p1 means a teacher who always gives back books without delay can borrow books from the teacher's reading room, and p2 and p3 means a teacher who has taught a course at least one time can create, administer, grade and record the exam. Suppose a teacher t (t has the role teacher) requires a student, say s, to borrow books from the teacher's reading room on their behalf. They must first create a temporary delegation role tdr, and then assign p1 to it. Now, tdr.DAE is type='T' AND without-delay='Y'. In this case, suppose DAE: type='T'≥DAE: type='S' and all students have the same DAE: type='S' but they have not the attribute without-delay. t cannot perform a decided-delegatee delegation, for s is not a qualified delegatee of tdr. Then t tries to perform an undecided-delegatee delegation. Because none of the students satisfy tdr's DAE, he/she cannot delegate p1 to a student in an undecided-delegatee delegation either. In fact, there are some differences between p1 and p2, p3: p1 can be temporarily delegated to a person who has not the required qualifications and abilities. Actually, in a temporary delegation the DAE of p1 is a restriction on the delegators not the delegatees, while in a permanent delegation it is a restriction on the delegatees not the delegators. It will not cause any security problem if p1 has been delegated to an unqualified person temporarily. But p1 cannot be permanently delegated to an unqualified person, for that will go against security policy. p2 and p3 can only be delegated to a person if he/she has the required qualifications and abilities both in a temporary and permanent delegation. So, a person with a role teacher can delegate their permissions p1 to a person temporarily but they cannot temporarily delegate permissions p2 and p3 to a person in any cases. That is, p1 can be delegated to a low level person temporarily but not permanently.
permissions of teacher permission's DAE
p1:borrow books from the teacher's reading room type='T' AND without-delay='Y' p2:prepare and administer exam type='T' AND number-of-timesу1 p3:grade and record exam type='T' AND number-of-timesу1
ABDM X
To overcome this shortcoming, we introduce a model named ABDM X , which is an extension of ABDM. In this model, there are two different types of permissions: monotonous permission (MP) and non-monotonous permission (NMP). MP can be temporarily or permanently delegated to a qualified person, while NMP can only be temporarily delegated to a low level delegatee candidate.
Definition 5 a permission p is a MP if it has an identical restriction on delegatee's DAE both in a temporary and a permanent delegation. p is a NMP if it has restriction on delegatee's DAE only in a permanent delegation. MN (p) is a function defined as follows:
That is, a non-monotonous role has no restriction on delegatee's DAE in a temporary delegation. Because ABDM does not support delegation with NMPs, we must modify it to meet this requirement. To distinguish the different types of delegation, we use symbols PMN and TMP to denote a permanent and a temporary delegation respectively.
Definition 7 the following is a list of ABDM X components: • R, RR, TDR, S, P, P M , P N , U, Ude, Uee, TDR M ,TDR N and TDR are sets of roles, regular roles, temporary delegation roles, sessions, permissions, MPs, NMPs, users, decided-delegatee candidates, undecided-delegatee candidates, monotonous temporary delegation roles, nonmonotonous temporary delegation roles and temporary delegation roles respectively.
is a user to regular role assignment.
• UDAM ⊆ Ude × TDR M is a decided-delegatee to monotonous temporary delegation role assignment.
• UDAN ⊆ Ude × TDR N is a decided-delegatee to non-monotonous temporary delegation role assignment.
• UEAM ⊆ Uee × TDR M is an undecided-delegatee to monotonous temporary delegation role assignment.
• UEAN ⊆ Uee × TDR N is an undecided-delegatee to non-monotonous temporary delegation role assignment.
is a permission to regular role assignment.
• PDA ⊆ P × TDR is a permission to temporary delegation role assignment.
A NMP means it has no restriction on delegatee's DAE in a temporary delegation. Permission's monotony must be specified by the system administrator or security administrator beforehand.
Definition 6 a temporary delegation role tdr is a monotonous temporary delegation role if it has an identical restriction on delegatee's DAE both in a temporary and a permanent delegation. tdr is a non-monotonous temporary delegation role if it has restriction on delegatee's DAE only in a permanent delegation. MN (tdr) is a function defined as follows:
roles (u) = {r| (u,r)∈UA} • per_r: RR→2 P is a function mapping a regular role to a set of permissions.
per_r(r) = {p|(∃ r'≤ r)(p, r')∈PRA} • per_d: TDR→2 P is a function mapping a temporary delegation role to a set of permissions.
per_d(tdr)={p| (∃ tdr'≤ tdr) ((p, tdr' )∈PDA)} • per_u:U→2 P is a function mapping a user to a set of permissions.
per_u(u)={p|(∃ r ∈RR)((u,r) ∈URA ⌳(p, r) ∈PRA)} ∪ {p|(∃ r ∈TDR)((u,r) ∈UDA ⌳(p, r) ∈PDA)} ∪ {p|(∃ r ∈TDR)((u,r) ∈UEA ⌳ (p, r) ∈PDA)} • Ude:TDR→2 U is a function mapping a temporary delegation role to a set of users that assigned to this role.
TDR→2 U is a function mapping a temporary delegation role to a set of qualified users. ={PMN|(u, tdr) ∈ UDA ⌳ tdr has been permanently delegated to u} • Delegation_type (u, tdr)={TMP|(u, tdr) ∈ UDA ⌳ tdr has been temporarily delegated to u} • can-delegateMU ⊆ R × CR × Uee × TDR M is a delegation constraint on UEAM in a permanent or temporary delegation.
With temporary delegation roles' DAEs, can-delegateM can restrict delegatees in both types of delegations. can-delegateTN can only be used in a temporary delegation with non-monotonous temporary delegation roles, while in a permanent delegation, can-delegatePN can restrict delegatees with temporary delegation role's DAE. can-delegateMU means a delegator can perform an undecided-delegatee permanent or temporary delegation with monotonous temporary delegation roles, while can-delegatePU means a delegator can permanent delegate non-monotonous temporary delegation roles to undecided-delegatees.
Let us discuss the example presented in Section 4 again to show how this extended model works. In one case, teacher t wants to temporarily delegate permissions p1 to a student s. They can delegate it according to the following steps (in Table 3 Undecided-delegatee delegation with MPs and delegation evocation in ABDM X are similar to those in ABDM. Revocation in ABDM X is similar to that in ABDM.
Delegation security in ABDM X
We now discuss delegation security in ABDM X according to a temporary delegation role tdr's monotony 1. MN (tdr) =True
In this case, tdr has MPs and the delegator can perform delegation by UDAM or UEAM. Because there are not any restrictions on delegation's type in both can-delegateM and can-delegateMU, a delegatee must be a qualified one when assigned to tdr either in a permanent or temporary delegation.
As we can see in Definition 7, a delegator cannot temporarily or permanently delegate MPs to unqualified delegatees.
MN (tdr) =False
In this case, tdr has NMPs and the delegator can perform delegation with UDAN or UEAN.
Although can-delegateTN cannot restrict delegatees with DAE, there will be no security problem in the delegation. The reason is that in fact NMPs have no restrictions on delegatees' DAEs in a temporary delegation.
A delegator cannot permanently delegate NMPs to unqualified delegatees by UDAN or UEAN. In ABDM X , can-delegatePN can restrict delegatees with both DAE and CR. That means a delegatee must satisfy both DAE and CR when assigned to a temporary delegation role tdr in a permanent delegation. Although can-delegatePU cannot restrict delegatees with DAE directly, but the definition of Uee(tdr) means all members in Uee(tdr) must satisfy tdr.DAE. So a delegator cannot permanently delegate NMPs to an unqualified delegatee in an undecided-delegatee delegation.
DISCUSSION
In some existing delegation models, such as RBDM and RDM2000, delegation is controlled by a delegator or a system administrator. There are no restrictions on delegatee candidates except prerequisite roles. These models have the highest flexibility but lowest security in delegation. In PBDM, a delegator cannot delegate some high level permissions to low level delegatees under the supervision of the system administrator. PBDM has a medium flexibility and security in delegation. ABDM has a strict delegation constraint consisting of prerequisite roles (CR) and temporary delegation role's attribute expression (DAE). A delegatee's prerequisite roles and DAE must satisfy CR and DAE of delegation constraint simultaneously when they are assigned to a temporary delegation role. A delegator cannot delegate high level permissions to an unqualified user in any case. Because delegatee candidates are limited by delegation constraint, ABDM is believed to have the lowest flexibility but highest security in delegation. In ABDM X , a delegator can temporarily delegate NMPs to an unqualified low level user but cannot temporarily delegate MPs or NMPs to an unqualified delegatee in any case. ABDM X does not cause any security problems in temporary delegation for NMPs in fact have no restrictions on delegatee candidates' DAEs. So, ABDM X has a medium flexibility but the same security level as that of ABDM in delegation.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a novel delegation model ABDM and its extension ABDM X . As a delegation model based on permission and user's attribute, the main feature of it is that it uses user and permission attribute expression as a part of delegation constraint. ABDM is a securer delegation model for it can restrict delegatee candidates more strictly. ABDM X is more flexible than ABDM in delegation. For in ABDM X , a delegator can temporarily delegate NMPs to low level users without causing any security problems. Both ABDM and ABDM X can be used in temporary and permanent delegation and make delegation securer and more flexible.
Further work includes supporting more constraints in ABDM and ABDM X , such as separation of duty and cardinality, and revocation with DAE in them.
